Introduction
The recent award of the Nobel Peace Prize to scientific and popular advocates of the climate change issue signals the recognition of the concerns that the human and political consequences of climate change are a threat to world peace and that new approaches are urgently needed. However, the interface of climate change and Millennium Development Goals (especially 1 and 7 on poverty reduction and sustainable development) urges attention to adaptation by the most vulnerable groups, and for making sure that mitigation measures do not, without appropriate compensation, exclude rural poor from land use options that could get them out of poverty. Innovative solutions on the interface of adaptation, mitigation and poverty reduction are much needed yet are still being tested (Lipper and Cavatassi, 2004; Skutsch et al., 2007; Verchot et al., 2007; IPCC, 2007) .
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was established to avoid negative impacts of climate change through prevention, mitigation and adaptation, but has so far not included a mechanism to provide incentives for emissions from forests and peatlands. The omission of nearly one fifth of global emissions, in the form of deforestation and land use change, from the global rules of the game is not rational (Stern, 2006; Schlamadinger et al., 2007; Kanninen et al., 2007; UNFCCC 2007) . Efforts to deal with much smaller fractions of total net emissions, through A/R CDM (Afforestation and Reforestation as form of Clean Development Mechanism; Mizuno, 2007) , can hardly be taken seriously if these much larger fluxes from deforestation and other carbon stock degradation are not brought under control. The Kyoto Protocol that set emission reduction targets for countries with high per capita emissions will end in 2012 and current discussions focus on inclusion of incentives for reducing these emissions from deforestation and forest/peatland degradation (REDD) in a post-2012 international climate regime of commitments and incentives.
Indonesia is taking a proactive role in the international negotiations of new regimes of commitments and incentives and will try to prove during the 2008 -2012 period of the Kyoto protocol that REDD mechanisms can work in Indonesia and that the global community can benefit from a full-scale REDD inclusion in a post-Kyoto regime.
Based on the range of possible emission reduction strategies and the expected future price of carbon credits, the total international transfers for REDD to Indonesia may well become a hundred million US-$ to several billion US-$ per year. For some this creates hope, for others concern. Learning from the post-Tsunami conflict resolution in Aceh, and conflict reemergence in Sri Lanka, we can safely predict that expectations of a REDD Tsunami of carbon money will raise the stakes on the debate on the forest margins where deforestation and degradation occur. Depending on the way the benefit sharing is achieved, these extra funds can help to find peace or can lead to increased open conflict. Payment distribution mechanisms are therefore highly political and contested. This paper summarizes one of the studies undertaken by the Indonesian Forest Climate Alliance (IFCA) to support Indonesian stakeholders to participate in global negotiations. It is based on an intensive process of consultations with national stakeholders of the forests and forestry sector on Indonesia, representatives of Indonesia in the international climate change negotiations and local stakeholders in some of the areas where our institutions have long term engagement with the change in forest conditions. In the consultative meetings the starting point was the current international context for Indonesia's emissions, followed by an assessment of the 'bargaining position' and scope of REDD mechanisms. After that the focus shifted to how such mechanism might be beneficial and how it would differ from the many previous and ongoing attempts to conserve forests. Based on this experience, the design options for a national REDD payment systems could be related to the principles derived to secure multiple benefits. In line with this sequence, this paper describes the findings under six headings, followed by a general discussion:
A. Questions on international architecture for REDD, B. Indonesia's bargaining position as high emission country, C. Scope of REDD and risks of partial accounting, D. Principles for achieving triple bottom-line (people, planet, profits) benefits, E. Existing experience with regulatory, fund and market based approaches, F. Potential for national Indonesian REDD payments system.
Questions On International Architecture For Redd
Two types of financial transfers have so far been proposed to provide incentives for reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation: the creation of a separate REDD fund, with a mandate to target emission reductions in forested countries, and the creation of tradable rights to emit, that could be the basis for a market in emission reduction credits (UNFCCC, 2007) . With both options on the table, the negotiation position for a country such as Indonesia is likely to depend on the answer to the following five questions (Figure 1 Basic architecture of the relations between a country such as Indonesia and countries with commitments to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere; A…E refers to five questions that are part of the current debate Different segments of society may place different weights on these questions, in line with intrinsic positions of trying to maximize short-term financial gains, long-term sustainable development and concerns about environmental degradation. An alternative way of posing these questions is in terms of:
• Slicing the cake: who will get which part? (competition and bargaining for a specified resource)
• The size of the cake: how can the total amount to be distributed be increased? (strategies for competition at higher level, influencing rules of the game)
• How palatable and attractive will the cake be? How will it taste and smell? What's the recipe?
• Who will pay for the cake? Will it provide a 'free lunch' or come with strings attached?
The issues about size of the cake and the rules for slicing it occur at multiple scales: between the sovereign countries that consider signing and ratifying an agreement, and between administrations, sectors and actors within each country. Three types of arguments, referring to 'poverty', 'rights' and 'shared responsibility' (see below) are and will be used in various combinations for maximum effect to increase the bargaining position by combinations of 'threat' and 'trust'. Overemphasis on the 'rights' card may come across as blackmail. Overemphasis of the 'shared responsibility' aspect will lead to 'lack of additionality', while the 'poverty' card is more effective when expressed in terms of evolution towards equitable per capita emissions.
Should Indonesia get a large (market) share of the 'avoided deforestation' because it has a track record of high emissions so it can show emission reduction? Should the province of Riau be where most of the funds go because it has a track record of high emissions so it can show emission reduction? Should the providers of raw material to the pulp and paper sector in Riau get most of the funds because they have a track record of high emissions and deforestation so they can show emission reduction? Or, should the attention go to countries, provinces and actors that have a track record of protecting their forests and thus be trustworthy partners? At each scale that this question is asked, there is a 'moral' or 'justice' dimension to it, and a 'pragmatic' or 'efficiency' one. The challenge for the 'distribution mechanisms' is to strike a balance between these two dimensions.
Indonesia's Bargaining Position As High Emission Country
Indonesia may well be the largest global emitter of CO2 and other greenhouse gases from the land use change and forestry (AFOLU (Agriculture Forestry and Land Use Change) or LULUCF (Land Use, Land Use and Cover Change, and Forestry) in the IPCC reporting guidelines) sector. With total emissions of 2.5 Gt year -1 (Table 1 ; Murdiyarso and Adiningsih, 2007) it is third overall after China and USA, whose emissions derive from fossil fuel use. The details of the emission and ranking are contested, but the emissions are a serious concern to all, and reduction is urgent in the light of the targets set by the UNFCCC. The emissions from peatlands, both those due to drainage for agricultural use and the drainage-induced fire risks in dry years, come to more than half of Indonesia's total emissions, although peatland is a relatively small area and have relatively small economic benefits. "We have rights to manage our lands the way we want; some countries that deforested in the past are now rich"; "Sharing responsibility: We are committed to do our share of the global clean-up and work to protect the environment and reduce emissions, but there are real 'opportunity costs' that need to be compensated".
Various permutations of these answers have been presented over time, and the international community has responded with a mixture of guilt, commitment and business-sense. Investing in 'clean development', either under the rules of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or in voluntary forms, has provided ways to enhance the standing of the investor and have been more cost effective than further efforts to reduce emissions at home. The UNFCCC is an agreement between sovereign nations, and has to respect the diplomatic negotiations in which the poverty, the rights and the shared responsibility arguments are used for maximum gain. Recent positioning of the main forest countries refers to commitments and shared responsibilities in the search for constructive solutions and international benefit transfers.
A substantial number of case studies is now available on the relations between local communities and their (agro)forest management in Indonesia, with consequences for the design of reduced-emission development pathways Miyamoto, 2006; Tomich et al., 2002; Cacho et al., 2007; Van Noordwijk et al., 2005) .
Scope Of Redd And Risks Of Partial Accounting
Based on internationally available data (Fig 2) , Indonesia has a comparatively high 'forest degradation' rate, both in absolute terms and in relative terms of rate of 'deforestation'. This may in part reflect the different nature of forest conversion. In Brazil nearly all forest conversion is based on clear felling followed by conversion to pasture with little if any trees. In Indonesia a gradual loss of large and smaller trees takes place before final conversion. Indonesia thus is directly interested in a REDD rather than RED program.
Figure 2.
Comparison of forest area change ('deforestation') and loss of growing stock ('degradation') in nationally reported forest data in the FAO forest resource assessment (Marklund and Schoene, 2006) ; the position of Indonesia indicates much stronger 'forest degradation' than 'area-based deforestation', while globally the two indicators are more strongly correlated Although Indonesia has no shortage of land area that lost its forest cover before 1990 (Murdiyarso et al., 2008) , the widespread expectation that the afforestation/reforestation approach to Clean Development Mechanisms (A/R CDM) could find serious application and lead to sustainable development benefits has not so far materialized. No project designs have yet been approved by the Designated National Authority (DNA), despite considerable efforts from local, national and international partners. The main challenges, according to van Noordwijk et al. (2008) , to implementation of the current A/R CDM mechanisms are in 1) the definition of forest and its institutional implications, 2) the projectization that is embedded in the definition of CDM, 3) non-linear baselines related to forest transitions that complicate attribution, 4) inherent lack of synergy with other development activities and 5) high transaction costs and temporary nature of credits.
Chomitz (2007) distinguished three types of forest in relation to likelihood of imminent change: 'core forests', 'forest margins' with rapid loss of forest cover and contests over land use rights, and 'mosaic forests' in the (partial) recovery phase after land rights were established. Baselines of the change in forest cover and/or carbon stock probably are usually non-linear, at least at a local scale of assessment, and make transitions from degradation into a rehabilitation phase in the absence of specific interventions. The relationship between the 'degradation' and 'rehabilitation' phases of a landscape are still debated (Tomich et al. 2005 , Geist et al., 2006 Rudel, 2007) . In the environmental literature the phenomenon is discussed by reference to the Kuznets curve or 'forest transition' (Mather, 1992; Angelsen, 2007) . A number of Asian countries already show an increase in forest area (but not necessarily in terrestrial carbon stocks) in their national statistics, based on plantation forestry (Mather 2007) . Rudel et al. (2005) suggested two possible pathways for advanced forest transition. One is the "economic development route", where the agricultural population declines as industrialisation and urban migration proceed, and abandoned agricultural land is spontaneously reforested (this has happened in parts of Europe and N America). The other, is the "forest scarcity pathway", where scarcity of forest products drives up price and stimulates tree planting. There are, however, considerable time lags in this response (Palo, 2004) .
The necessity of 'whole system' accounting for net anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gasses is gaining ground (Cowie et al., 2007 : "Ideally, the accounting approach should cover all significant biospheric sources and sinks, avoid biased or unbalanced accounting, avoid leakage and require no arbitrary adjustments to remedy unintended consequences"). The current system of rules and its 'path dependence' (O'Riordan and Jordan, 1999), or stepwise evolution from precursors under the selection pressures of the day, is under scrutiny and a wider set of alternatives is needed (Benndorf et al., 2007) .
In terms of the scope of the current discussions it may be important to specify which parts of the LULUCF (AFOLU) emissions outside of Annex-I countries will not be covered ( Figure  3 ):
emissions from lands that dropped out of the 'forest category' before reference year X (yet to be selected), or never qualified as forest. Quantitatively, the peatlands are the most significant contributor in this regard. The long-term nature of peatland emissions, based on a few percent loss from a huge C-stock, contrasts with the rapid loss of above-ground biomass (potentially a near complete loss of a moderate Cstock), makes the choice of X important in this regard.
sequestration by lands that re-enter the forest category, even if they have been only marginally below the forest threshold.
C sequestration through reforestation of lands deforested after 1990, and thus not eligible for A/R CDM.
The biophysical assessment of C-stock changes is not that difficult, but the political attribution of blame and credit is. 
Principles For Achieving Triple Bottomline (People, Planet, Profits) Benefits
Triple accountability to people, profit and planet requires the emergence of incentive systems that 1) are efficient in reducing emissions at affordable cost, linking local to international scales in ways that are accountable for emissions but that are as simple as possible, 2) address 'climate justice', equity and fairness, within improved systems of governance and accountability from local to international scales, 3) support transformations to sustainability for the long term within the local context of options and aspirations, and 4) express a commitment to learning and accountability for the process.
In hindsight, the complexities of integrating 'avoided deforestation' in the global 'clean development mechanism' that lead to its exclusion in the Marrakech accord may be clear. Are we confident that sufficient progress has been made on all fronts to make REDD acceptable now? Table 2 tries to summarize the current position. There has been considerable progress in opportunities for global C accounting (DeFries et al., 2007; Trines et al., 2006; Brown et al., 2007; Canadell et al., 2007; Palm et al., 2005) , and challenges of deriving baselines are better understood Sathaye and Andrasko, 2007) . With fossil fuel use was seen as the ultimate cause of high emissions, transitions to sustainability will primarily depend on shifts in energy source
The 'biofuel' debate has shown that shifts to renewable fuels may lead to net increase in emissions if the links with land-based emissions (incl. REDD) is not accounted for 11. Flooding the market Large emission reductions might be achieved at low cost, undercutting the efforts to transform industry and energy sector through CDM Not achieving large emissions that can be achieved at low cost undermines credibility of the rest of the system; a substantive increase in total emission reduction will increase 'demand' and absorb the additional 'supply' of emission reduction credits 12. Scope
The popular association of terrestrial vegetation + soil sources and sinks with the term 'forest' lead to a need for tighter operational definitions of the term and uncertainty on inclusion/ exclusion of intermediate tree density vegetation Important and avoidable emission sources will still be excluded if current REDD proposals go forward; a broadening of the scope to other chapters in the IPCC national GHG accounting is advisable
Existing Experience With Regulatory, Fund And Market Based Approaches In Indonesia
A recent review of the macro-economic context of forestry in Indonesia and opportunities for external assistance (World Bank, 2007) documented the overcapacity in the pulp and paper sector and the lack of clarity on the legal status of forests across Indonesia, with the contesting claims by the state and local communities unresolved. The conflicts between state-sanctioned concessionaires and local communities are considered to be at the basis of part of the forest fires (Tomich et al., 1998; Suyanto, 2007) . While 'governance' issues are now widely seen as a priority (Purnomo, 2006; Tacconi, 2007) , the more specific issues of rights and conflict resolution require detailed analysis of each case and local ways to reduce conflict (ContrerasHermosilla and Fay 2005; Griffiths, 2007; Kusters et al., 2007; Suyanto et al., 2007) . Benefits to the local community of enhanced forest management for emission reduction may not be easy to achieve (Murdiyarso and Herawati, 2005; Murdiyarso and Skutsch, 2006) , as the experience with partnerships between plantation companies and local communities have shown (Nawir and Santoso, 2005) .
Existing funding and incentives schemes in Indonesia give insights into the way REDD mechanisms might work, offer possible options that could be used in payment distribution mechanisms and possible issues that could arise. Table 3 summarizes the main features of nine different mechanisms. Two main scales can be distinguished:
• Funding mechanisms from central government to local governments, companies or direct to communities
• Smaller-scale redistribution mechanisms at a local level within villages, between local government and communities and between companies and local communities Both of these are relevant to possible future configurations of payment schemes in national REDD mechanisms in Indonesia. The evidence indicates that most of these systems are subject to risks in a number of dimensions:
• Lack of transparency and accountability and high corruption
• Opportunities for rent seeking and high transaction costs related to long transaction chains
• Perverse incentives
• Elite capture and in-migration into areas where incentives are offered
• Lack of demand.
Safeguards can be put in place to minimize some of these risks, which mainly relate to increasing accountability between actors through formalized third party audit processes and 'paper trails', ensuring inclusive consultation processes and improving the bargaining power of different stakeholders by enhancing legality and access to legal processes. The conditionality requirement of REDD mechanisms (i.e. that benefits are only received once performance has been verified) is likely to improve safeguards in REDD. Many of the existing systems in Indonesia have low conditionality requirements, with the exception of PES, company-community partnerships, a specific district development program (KDP) and timber certification.
Learning from existing fund and incentive management, the future REDD system should have the following features: (a) create incentives for good practice; (b) be transparent and accountable in fund management; (c) support local initiative within clearly stated goals; (d) focus on outcomes and not just inputs; (e) establish a relationship between outcome/performance and funding; (f) support clear property rights and rules on benefits, responsibilities and sanctions at the local level; and (g) facilitate and strengthen local institutions.
Potential For National Indonesian Redd Payments System
Designing an Indonesian national REDD payments system will involve decisions over the best way to configure financial transfer mechanisms at different scales, how to allocate revenues, payment form and timing, the establishment of new institutional structures and new risk management options.
The first issue to consider in REDD transfer mechanisms in Indonesia, is where primary transaction with international buyers or funders takes place. There are two options: (1) transaction with the central government and (2) transaction with lower government levels or directly with projects ( Figure 4 ) in accordance with the relative share of the location in the national baseline. Each of these options implies a different form of redistribution mechanism in Indonesia. Option 1 is more centralised and government funds would need to be redistributed from a central fund held at national level. Option 2 is more decentralised, but a tax or levy placed on REDD activities at sub-national level would need to be collected to pay for administrative functions such as national level monitoring and accounting. Funding mechanisms would still be required in this option in order to redistribute revenues accrued through the tax or levy. 
Allocation of REDD financing
There are both horizontal and vertical dimensions to the allocation of REDD payments. The horizontal dimension relates to the distribution of revenues between stakeholders at a particular scale, for example between the islands of Indonesia or between different stakeholders in a REDD project. The vertical dimension relates to allocation within different administrative levels, for example between national, provincial and district governments.
The question of allocation within both of these dimensions is linked to who should be the legitimate recipients of REDD revenues. In order to meet the overarching principles outlined in the first section, possible criteria for establishing who is a legitimate recipient are those that:
• Change their behaviour and reduce emission rates in the long term
• Suffer legitimate losses from mandated REDD implementation
• Maintain low carbon emissions rates (continued conservation)
• Provide sustainable livelihoods with low C emission consequences
• Act legally and have rights to sell carbon (provided this does not disadvantage the poor and those with customary rights not recognized by government)
• Exhibit high accountability, transparency and good governance
• Have included provisions for capacity building
• Include elements of long term learning Competitive bidding processes are a possible way of deciding horizontal allocation. Precautions (e.g. through multi-stakeholder review panels) may need to be taken to ensure that this is not abused by decision-makers. Support through NGOs to help fill capacity and information gaps may be needed to avoid discrimination against local communities who lack experience framing such proposals. In practice in Indonesia it will probably be necessary to establish a REDD system by providing some level of initial funding to all regions and stakeholders in order for them to develop REDD systems, before introducing conditional and competitive processes that might discriminate against marginalized groups.
Legality of current actors engaged in activities that lead to CO 2 emissions from forests and peatlands is not easily established. For example, major pulp and paper mills maintain that they a) have no engagement whatsoever in illegal logging, but nevertheless b) may have to close their business if current 'illegal logging control' operations continue. As use of forest resources usually requires more than one type of permit, revoking forest use concessions may lead to claims for compensation. Land ownership does not necessarily coincide with the right to change the vegetation and hence terrestrial carbon stock. Separate regulation of 'rights to sell' (as the most functional dimension of 'ownership') of carbon storage and/or other environmental service (ES) is feasible, but in the implementation the various (and often conflicting) claims on land ownership need to be taken into account.
These issues are further complicated by definitions of 'forest'. "Forests" without trees as well as "non-forest" lands with full canopy cover of trees can occur side-by-side. Restriction of REDD to the existing forest institutions will exclude a large share of likely but avoideable emissions. For REDD to work payment systems must be able to transcend the way 'forest' is constructed as institutional concept and address changes in carbon stocks. Local government entities (e.g. at Kabupaten (district) scale), may be the most appropriate scale for assessing net changes in terrestrial carbon stocks, regardless of the institutional control over the lands and vegetation. Current 'decentralization' laws specify the primary responsibility for maintenance of 'protective' land cover through forests at the Kabupaten level, while timber exploitation rights are decided nationally. These different domains of decision-making would need to be reconciled.
Vertical allocation depends on where value addition occurs in the REDD 'supply chain' and the opportunity costs occurring at each level. For example, in a national system it can be assumed that the Indonesian government will bear the costs of establishing the national system, national scale monitoring and verification, implementation of national policy reforms and national level administration of the system, as well as opportunity costs related to lost tax revenue, for example. It can be assumed from past experience that the greater the level of devolution, the higher these relative costs will be, as will be the opportunities for rent seeking in the system. From an efficiency perspective it is therefore preferable to try to minimise the number of stakeholders in the supply chain.
Form of payment, payment schedule and provision of upfront financing
Every further day a forest exists, there is an opportunity for it to be deforested. To ensure long term emission reduction incentives must match the theoretically infinite series of foregone opportunities. Two main payment schedules that could occur under REDD: A lump sum upfront payment would involve transferral of the agreed amount of funding all at once but this would need to fund forest protection for at least, say, 100 years. This would favour current beneficiaries but it could severely restrict land use options for future generations, and they would likely demand compensation for this. Weak or biased enforcement would also undermine ability to translate agreement into reality. An alternative option is to distribute payments over time. Although current beneficiaries might gain less, a distributed payment schedule incentivizes long term carbon storage, and therefore is more likely to address the permanence issue. The main challenge to be overcome will be to secure long term financing for such distributed payments.
Payments could be made to individuals or to groups. If all stakeholders are well identified, then individual payments matching their opportunity costs are likely to be most effective and there is less likelihood of elite capture if stakeholders are able to assert their rights to payments. However, the transaction costs of dealing with large numbers of individual contracts gives rise to a trade-off. Payments to groups might involve lower transaction costs for those making the payments, but mechanisms for equitable decision-making on rules and procedures for benefits sharing within the group are likely to be required.
Payments for REDD can be made as cash and non-cash transactions ( Figure 5 ). For cash transaction, the carbon credit international buyers for example could pay in cash to the sellers (government, community or company) through bank transfer based on an agreed terms of conditions. The sellers may then redistribute the cash to those who participate in CREDD value chains. Local negotiations on the 'currency' that is of the highest relevance are needed. 
Institutional arrangements
Existing institutions, associated with 'business as usual', will need to be reconstructed to make a change and reduce emissions. A REDD value chain will include fund managers for receiving and redistributing funds; registries for tracking emissions reductions credits; legal institutions for adjusting existing laws, enforcing REDD related laws and resolving disputes; monitoring and verification entities for ensuring that emissions reductions are real and achieved in environmentally and socially acceptable ways; implementing and administrative organisations for handling contracts and logistics; and the sellers of carbon themselves who may need to organise internal redistribution mechanisms.
The national government might act as a seller of carbon to international buyers, a buyer of carbon from sub-national entities, an intermediary and a regulator of the system. It is assumed that in any form of national REDD system that the government will play a role in monitoring, accounting for emissions reductions and technical support. From an accountability perspective it may be preferable for the government not to be involved in financial transactions as a buyer or seller (i.e. transactions should occur at lower levels). To guarantee fairness clear mechanisms for checks and balances from independent third parties will be required, whichever institutions are involved. The institutional arrangements will have to address the cross-scale issues along the value chain from local action to international benefits ( Figure 6 ); they will have to link the global CO 2 -benefits to local CO-benefits in the form of sustainable livelihood options. 
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Discussion: Proposed Principles
If Indonesia is to reduce its net emissions from deforestation and degradation of forests and peatlands, and on that basis access international REDD funds or markets, it will have to achieve progress on a number of challenges. It will have to:
1. provide efficiency as well as fairness: Focus on the areas, drivers and sectors that are currently most directly linked (legally or illegally) to emissions from deforestation and forest/peatland degradation, and provide appropriate incentives to areas, drivers and sectors that actively contribute to resource conservation, and provide new options to those at a cross-roads of alternative development pathways;
2. develop and operationalize a vision of a long term transition to sustainability that meets the Millennium Development Goals, respects the rights of forest and agroforest communities, transcends economic dependence on extractive industries and finds a balance between ecosystem 'goods' and 'services'; 3. improve the transparency and accountability of governance systems that link the local to the national scale, address the multiple conflicts over access and rights to lands and forest resources, by setting performance-based standards for dialogue and conflict resolution;
4. enhance the REDDiness of local and national stakeholders by creating active learning on what emission reduction with effective feedback systems is about, enhance awareness, develop local monitoring skills, and support local creativity in finding effective solutions through appropriate incentive systems.
Each of these principles can be operationalized at the level of criteria, indicators and verifiers. Overall REDD architecture (and payment distribution mechanisms within this framework) will need a combination of functions, provided by appropriate institutions. Important components already exist; others are missing or are not yet fully performing the functions required.
The 'fairness' versus 'efficiency' debate can be interpreted in terms of the four principles, and associated criteria and indicators that apply to 'rewards for environmental services ': realistic, conditional, voluntary and 'pro-poor' (Van Noordwijk et al., 2006) , with the first two mostly linked to 'efficiency' and the last two mostly to 'fairness'.
An important consequence of these principles is that all agents along the REDD value chain will have to obtain sufficient benefits to make their engagement worthwhile. During the IFCA discussions the REDD 'value chain' was analyzed in three main components (I-III) and eight steps (a-h):
I. Efficiency focus on realistic local emission reduction that makes the investment costeffective:
a. Actual emission reduction on the ground.
II. Fairness focus that rewards local investments in a low-carbon economy:
b. Provision of sustainable livelihoods that reduce local threats to the carbon stored in the landscape.
III. Manageable transaction costs that link local to national emissions and certifies emission reduction:
c.
Protection against 'leakage' by providing local income opportunities, d. Securing 'additionality' over 'baselines' in a context of local development planning, e. Accounting for changes in C stock in a consistent national framework, f. Provision of institutional framework (e.g. by signing international agreements and reviewing legal context of 'rights to pollute'), g. Independent verification of emission data, h. Salesmanship in linking potential supply and demand for emission reduction.
An initial target was discussed for the design process to keep the 'transaction costs', as important as they are for the cross-scale relations between local actions and national-scale emission reduction, below 1/3 of the total cost of the mechanism. For the benefits available at local level, an equal split (both 35% of the total value) between offsetting opportunity costs for current emissions (efficieny focus) and investment in sustainable livelihoods was discussed (Table 4) . These target values, however, may be averages that require local adjustment to the context at site level. Once REDD mechanisms become more widespread, the transaction cost components should be reduced further. In the selection of pilot areas for testing REDD in the next 2-3 years, the primary contrasts to be explored will have to focus on the most appropriate approach in 'current emission hot spots' as well as those for 'core forest areas' (criteria 1). The geographic and economic opportunities differ between Sumatra, Kalimantan, Papua and Sulawesi plus other islands in eastern Indonesia (criteria 2). The other three criteria are economic transition level from forest exploitation to forest conservation, level of governance, and REDD readiness. These site-based pilot activities aim to generate the following lessons (a) learning to balance efficiency and equity by appropriate mix of market and fund allocation processes; (b) learning how to initiate and support a transition to sustainable resource use; (c) learning how to improve and sustain governance systems; and (d) experience in effective capacity building approaches.
